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ABSTRACT
This paper tests the importance of precautionary and mercantilist motives in accounting for the
hoarding of international reserves by developing countries, and provides a model that quantifies the
welfare gains from optimal management of international reserves. While the variables associated
with the mercantilist motive are statistically significant, their economic importance in accounting
for reserve hoarding is close to zero and is dwarfed by other variables. Overall, the empirical results
are in line with the precautionary demand. The effects of financial crises have been localized,
increasing reserve hoarding in the aftermath of crises mostly in countries located in the affected
region, but not in other regions. We also investigate the micro foundation of precautionary demand,
extending Diamond and Dybvig (1983)'s model to an open, emerging market economy where banks
finance long-term projects with short-term deposits. We identify circumstances that lead to large
precautionary demand for international reserves, providing self-insurance against the adverse output
effects of sudden stop and capital flight shocks. This would be the case if premature liquidation of
long-term projects is costly, and the economy is de-facto integrated with the global financial system,
hence sudden stops and capital flight may reduce deposits sharply. We show that the welfare gain
from the optimal management of international reserves is of a first-order magnitude, reducing the
welfare cost of liquidity shocks from a first-order to a second-order magnitude.
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1.  Introduction and summary 
 
This paper has two goals: quantifying the relative importance of alternative views 
explaining international reserves accumulation, and modeling precautionary demand for 
international reserves, viewing it as self-insurance against costly output contractions induced by 
sudden stops and capital flight.  This model is used to provide welfare evaluation of the costs and 
benefits of hoarding reserves, and the optimal size of precautionary demand.   
The 1997-8 crisis in East Asia led to profound changes in the demand for international 
reserves, increasing over time the hoarding.  Several salient features of the 1997-8 crisis may 
provide clues to the changing attitude towards international reserves.  First, the magnitude and 
speed of the reversal of capital flows throughout the 1997-8 crisis surprised most observers.  
While the 1994 Tequila crisis induced the market to expect similar crises in Latin America, most 
viewed East Asian countries as being less vulnerable to the perils associated with “hot money.”
1  
This presumption followed from the prevalent pre-1997 view -- East Asian countries were more 
open to international trade, had sounder overall fiscal policies, and had stronger growth 
performance than Latin American countries.  In retrospect, the crisis exposed hidden 
vulnerabilities of East Asian countries, forcing the market to update the probability of sudden 
stops affecting all countries.  The crisis also led to sharp output and investment contractions, 
credit crunches, and—in several countries—to full-blown banking crises.
2  Finally, most affected 
countries went through tough adjustments, reversing the output contraction and resuming growth 
within several years. While a few countries flirted with capital controls, within two to three years 
most countries retained or increased their financial integration.   
The above observations suggest that hoarding international reserves can be viewed as a 
precautionary adjustment, reflecting the desire for self-insurance against exposure to future 
sudden stops. This view, however, faces a well-known contender in a modern incarnation of 
mercantilism: international reserves accumulations triggered by concerns about export 
competitiveness.  This explanation has been advanced by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber 
(2003), especially in the context of China.  They interpret reserves accumulation as a by-product 
                                                 
1 See Calvo (1998), Calvo and Mendoza (2000) and Edwards (2004) for further discussion on sudden 
stops of short-term capital flows. 
 
2 See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Hutchison and Noy (2002) for further discussion on the output 
costs associated with sudden stops.   2
of promoting exports, which is needed to create better jobs, thereby absorbing abundant labor in 
traditional sectors, mostly in agriculture. Under this strategy, reserves accumulation may 
facilitate export growth by preventing or slowing appreciation.  Some view the modern 
mercantilist approach as a valid interpretation for most East Asian countries, arguing that they 
follow similar development strategies.  This interpretation is intellectually intriguing, especially 
in the broader context of the “Revived Bretton Woods system,” yet it remains debatable.  Some 
have pointed out that high export growth is not the new kid on the block -- it is the story of East-
Asia during the last fifty years.  Yet, the large increase in hoarding reserves has happened mostly 
after 1997.  This issue is of more than academic importance: the precautionary approach links 
reserves accumulation directly to exposure to sudden stops, capital flight and volatility, whereas 
the mercantilist approach views reserves accumulation as a residual of an industrial policy, a 
policy that may impose negative externalities on other trading partners. 
Our empirical test augments previous econometric specifications of international reserves 
by adding two sets of variables.  The first set deals with factors associated with mercantilist 
motives: lagged export growth and deviations from predicted purchasing power parity (PPP).  
The second set of variables attempts to capture precautionary adjustment in the aftermath of 
unanticipated sudden-stop crises, using dummy variables.  Specifically, two crucial events were 
the 1994 Mexican crisis and the 1997 East Asian crisis.  Both happened at times of greater 
financial integration, promoted by relaxing capital controls.  Our results provide only a limited 
support for the mercantilist approach. While the variables associated with the mercantilist motive 
are statistically significant, their economic importance in accounting for reserves hoarding is 
close to zero and is dwarfed by other variables.  Specifically, trade openness, measured by the 
GDP share of imports, and crises variables are playing a much more important role in accounting 
for reserves accumulation than lagged export growth and PPP deviations. This result applies to 
all countries, including China.  Indeed, inspecting the magnitude of country-specific dummies 
reveals that China is not an outlier in the level of reserves. We also find strong localized effects 
of crises: while the 1994 Mexican crises increased reserves in Mexico, it did not affect reserves 
in East Asia.  Similarly, the 1997 crisis strongly increased the hoarding of reserves in East Asia, 
but not in Latin America.  Across all specifications, a more liberal capital account regime is 
found to increase the amount of international reserves. This by itself constitutes evidence in 
favor of the precautionary view, for capital account liberalization will boost the precautionary   3
motive more than the mercantilist motive. Moreover, the inclusion of capital control variables 
weaken the statistical significance of deviations from PPP, one of the two mercantilist variables, 
while having little effect on the statistical significance of crisis variables. 
Overall, the empirical results of Section 2 are in line with the precautionary demand.  
Yet, the precautionary demand approach has not been endorsed uniformly.  Skeptical views point 
out that the sheer magnitude of reserves accumulated by East Asian countries seems excessive 
once attention is paid to the opportunity costs of reserves.  In order to deal with these concerns, 
we provide in Section 3 a simple model characterizing and quantifying the welfare gains 
attributed to hoarding reserves in the presence of exposure to external liquidity shocks.  The 
model extends the literature dealing with the demand for bank reserves in the closed economy to 
the important, yet less studied open-economy context.
3  Specifically, we consider a country 
exposed to international liquidity shocks, which in turn can cause liquidation and consolidation 
of investment.  A key postulate of the analysis is that, short of having a credible international 
lender of last resort, hoarding international reserves is among the few options allowing 
developing countries to reduce the output costs of sudden stops.  While hoarding international 
reserves has its opportunity cost, we identify circumstances where the welfare gain from 
hoarding reserves is of a first-order magnitude, leading to potentially large precautionary demand 
for reserves. 
The earlier literature focused on using international reserves as part of the management of 
an adjustable-peg or managed-floating exchange rate regime [Frenkel (1983), Edwards (1983); 
see Flood and Marion (2001) for a literature review]. To our knowledge, our paper is the first 
econometric attempt to evaluate the relevance of the mercantilist approach in the aftermath of the 
1997 crisis [see Aizenman and Marion (2003); Edison (2003); and Aizenman, Lee and Rhee 
(2004) for earlier empirical analysis of related issues].  The model advanced in Section 3 
contributes to the growing literature linking international reserves with sovereign risk and limited 
access to the global capital market.  Past literature has considered precautionary motives for 
hoarding international reserves needed to stabilize fiscal expenditure in countries with limited 
                                                 
3 See Bryant (1980); Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Prisman, Solvin and Sushka (1986) for earlier literature 
dealing with optimal reserves (liquidity) policy in a closed economy. 
   4
taxing capacity and sovereign risk [see Aizenman and Marion (2004)].
4 Insurance perspectives 
of international reserves applying the option pricing theory are provided in Lee (2004). The 
model in this paper is more closely related to the literature viewing international reserves as 
output stabilizers [see Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992), Aizenman, Lee and Rhee (2004) and 
García and Soto (2004)].  Our paper adds to this literature by providing an explicit model of 
financial intermediation and adjustment subject to liquidity shocks, where hoarding international 
reserves emerges as part of the optimal financial intermediation.   
As our focus is on developing countries, we assume that all financial intermediation is 
done by banks, relying on debt contracts.  Specifically, we consider the case where investment in 
a long-term project should be undertaken prior to the realization of liquidity shocks.  Hence, 
shocks may force costly liquidation of earlier investments, thereby reducing output.  We solve 
the optimal demand for deposits and international reserves by a bank that finances investment in 
long-term projects.  The bank’s financing is done using callable foreign deposits, which exposes 
the bank to liquidity risk.  Macro liquidity shocks stemming from sudden stops and capital flights 
cannot be diversified away.
5  In these circumstances, hoarding reserves saves liquidation costs, 
potentially leading to large welfare gains, and these gains hold even if all agents are risk neutral.  
In this framework, deposits and reserves are complements – higher volatility of liquidity shocks 
will increase both the demand for reserves and deposits.  The optimal hoarding of reserves to 
accommodate more volatile liquidity shocks reduces the output cost of these shocks from first-
order to second-order magnitude.   
 
2.  International Reserves: Evidence 
  Our empirical analysis adds several new controls to past regressions.  The mercantilist 
view focuses on hoarding international reserves in order to prevent or mitigate appreciation, with 
                                                 
4 The precautionary demand modeled in this paper supplements the precautionary demand stemming from fiscal 
considerations.  For example, one may argue that the prospect of unification of North and South Korea [or a conflict 
in the worst-case scenario] may explain part of the hoarding of international reserves by Korea.  Yet, we may qualify 
this argument by noting that one expects the US and the OECD countries to provide the credit needed to finance the 
unification (or the conflict).  This argument, however, does not extend to the case of a sudden stop and capital flight.  
As the 1997 crisis illustrated, external finance at times of sudden stops is not forthcoming without stringent 
conditions and is frequently limited due to moral hazard considerations.  
  
5 The recent history of Argentina provided a vivid illustration of the limited ability to diversify away liquidity 
shocks.  In the mid-1990s Argentina negotiated contingent commercial credit lines in an attempt to provide external 
insurance against liquidity shocks.  These lines, however, dried up as Argentina approached the crisis.  
   5
the ultimate goal of increasing export growth.  Hence, we expect that reserves hoarding provoked 
by mercantilist concerns should be associated with higher export growth rate, and with 
deprecated real exchange rate relative to the fundamental PPP real exchange rate.  In order to 
control for export growth, we constructed a three-year moving average of the growth rate of real 
exports (denoted MVGX), lagged two years in the regression.
6  Our “fundamental” PPP real 
exchange rate is defined as the fitted value from the the regression of national price levels on the 
per-worker income relative to the U.S. for nearly 150 countries, motivated by the classic Penn 
effect (see the regression reported in Table 1A).
7 The deviations from the “fundamental” PPP 
value, denoted by PLDE, are measured by the residuals of this regression, and are found to bring 
about an appreciation in the nominal effective exchange rates in the subsequent year for our 
sample countries (lower panel of Table 1A). If a country whose price level is higher than the 
level implied by its relative income tends to accumulate international reserves in an effort to 
slow the pace of appreciation in its currency, the coefficient on PLDE will be positive in the 
regression of international reserves on usual determinants including PLDE.  
  The second set of controls attempts to capture the effects of two important crises: the 
1994 Mexican, and the 1997-8 East-Asian crises.  This is done by applying a dummy variable to 
each crisis [CRMEXEM: 1 since 1995, 0 before; CRASIAEM: 1 since 1998, 0 before].  In one of 
the regressions we apply continental dummies for each crisis (see data appendix for definitions). 
In addition, we control for log of population (LPOP); log of percent import share (LIMY);  
exchange rate volatility (VOL_XC); and log of per-capita income (LYPC) in one set of 
regressions. Various permutations of these regressions are summarized in Tables 1 and 2, 
covering 1980-2000.  Figures 1 and 2 summarize the contribution of the various variables in 
regression III to the dependent variable in the 1990s, for six countries [Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
China, Korea, and Mexico].  
The dependent variable in Table 1 is the reserves/broad money ratio.  Higher lagged 
export growth and national price level above the fundamental level predicted by relative GDP 
per capita regression are associated with higher reserves/broad money, and this effect is 
statistically significant.  Similarly, the Mexican and the East-Asian crises increased the demand 
for reserves, and this effect is statistically significant.   
                                                 
6 We used lags to deal with possible endogeneity issues. 
 
7 See Kravis (1984) for a classic reference on PPP, and Samuelson (1994) for the apt expression “Penn effect.”   6
Figure 1 allows one to inspect the economic significance of each variable in accounting 
for the observed reserves ratios for six countries. The solid line denotes the dependent variable, 
the ratio of reserves to broad money. All other lines, which denote the contribution of each 
variable to the reserves/broady money ratio, are calculated by multiplying each variable and the 
associated coefficient from regression. The variables presented separately in the figure are the 
import share (LIMY in the table), post crisis effect (the combined effect of CRMEXEM and 
CRASIAEM), export growth (MVGX), and the relative PPP (PLDE). All other variables—the 
population, exchange rate volatility and constant term—are combined into one series (others), 
because their effects show little variation over time.  
Figure 1 indicates a similar pattern for all the countries: trade openness is frequently the 
most important consideration.  The variables associated with mercantilist concerns are practically 
flat, and their economic significance in accounting for the observed hoarding of international 
reserves is close to zero.  The crisis variables play an important role in all the six countries, 
including China.  The regional crisis dummy variables used in regression IV reveal an intriguing 
pattern -- the Mexican crisis is associated with higher demand for reserves in Latin America, but 
not in Asia.  Similarly, the 1997 East-Asian crisis is associated with higher hoarding of reserves 
in Asia, but lower reserves in Latin America [a drop of 5 percentage points in the aftermath of 
the 1997 crisis]. Regression V reveals that the size of the variables associated with mercantile 
concerns is not impacted by crises, hence it rejects the possibility that crises magnified 
mercantilist concerns.  
The dependent variable in Table 2 is the reserves/GDP ratio, and per-capita income is 
excluded from the regression. Overall, the results are very similar to the one associated with 
reserves/broad money.  The main changes are that the impact of crises is sharper on 
reserves/GDP than on reserves/broad money.  Figure 2 summarizes the economic significance of 
each variable in accounting for the observed reserves ratios for six countries.  It reveals similar 
patterns to Figure 1.  Note that in the case of China, reserves/GDP ratio increased mostly after 
1994, from 0.10 in 1994 to about 0.16 in 1998-2000.  The most important variable “explaining” 
this increase in the reserves/GDP ratio is the crises dummies (about 0.05 out of the increase of 
0.06). All the other variables, including the two mercantilist variables, provide practically zero   7
explanation to reserves/GDP ratio, in terms of the level or the change.
8 Openness, measured by 
the import share, did not play a prominent role in this increase of the reserves/GDP ratio, but is 
an important explanator of the level of reserves. The import share accounts for 0.11 out of 0.16, 
the 1998-2000 average of the reserves/GDP ratio. The size of population also makes a very large 
contribution to the level of reserves, but varies little over time and thus is combined with other 
variables and the constant term in the figure.  
Nor is the mercantilist effect an important factor in accounting for differences in the level 
of reserves across different countries. Figure 3 compares the relative importance of several 
regressors by plotting the effect of an increase in the value of each variable by one standard 
deviation. In this figure, the standard deviation of each variable is calculated across countries 
using the data in 2000, but similar results arise when the standard deviations are calculated for 
the pooled data over the whole sample period. Among the two mercantilist variables, the 
deviation of the PPP exchange rate plays a more important role in explaining the reserves/GDP 
ratio, but its effect pales by the effects of crisis or openness. Population plays quantitatively the 
most important role in explaining cross-country differences in the level of reserves, but is not 
presented and compared with other variables in Figure 3. Population moves very little over time 
unlike other economic variables, making it conceptually more comparable to country specific 
effects rather than the effects of other economic variables.  
Figure 4 plots the distribution of the country specific effects, identifying the names of the 
six countries evaluated in Figures 1-2 and several others with country specific effects that differ 
from the average of all country specific effects by nearly or more than two standard deviations.  
Note that China’s country specific effect is negative, and is inconsistent with the notion that 
China’s large reserves make it an outlier in the context of the cross country panel comparison, 
1980-2000. For both China and India, the clear negative values of country specific effects reflect 
the large sizes of their population. In regressions that excluded the population variable from the 
regressors, the country specific effects on China and India were closer to zero than in the 
regressions with population. With or without considering the effect of population, China is not an 
outlier with a large positive country-specific effect.  One such country is Singapore, a country 
well known for its traditionally very high level of international reserves that often exceeded 80 
                                                 
8 See Prasad and Wei (2005) for recent skeptical perspectives about the mercantilist interpretation of Chinese 
reserves accumulation.   8
percent of its GDP during the sample period, and its country-specific effect is close to three 
standard deviations. Two countries with smaller but still large country-specific effect—about two 
standard deviations away from the average—are Cyprus and Hong Kong SAR, in the latter of 
which the currency board system necessitates a high level of reserves.  
In terms of the horse race between the mercantilist and precautionary views of 
international reserves, our results suggest that the precautionary motive played a more visible 
role in the accumulation of reserves than the mercantilist motive. At minimum, we could identify 
the likely effect of precautionary motive more easily and strongly than the likely effect of 
mercantilist motive.  
This summary interpretation remains intact when we control for changes in capital 
account regimes. Tables 3 and 4 repeat the regression of Tables 1 and 2, respectively, but 
including the variable that captures the degree of capital account liberalization (K liberalization). 
This variable, constructed by Edwards (2005), measures the degree of capital account 
liberalization in finer grids than most existing measures. Across all specifications, a more liberal 
capital account regime is found to increase the amount of international reserves. This by itself 
constitutes evidence in favor of the precautionary view, for capital account liberalization will 
boost the precautionary motive more than the mercantilist motive. Moreover, the inclusion of 
capital control variables weaken the statistical significance of PLDE, one of the two mercantilist 
variables, while having little effect on the statistical significance of crisis variables.   
 
3.   The model 
We construct a minimal model to explain the self insurance offered by international 
reserves in mitigating the output effects of liquidity shocks.  The structure of the model is akin to 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) -- investment in a long term project should be undertaken prior to 
the realization of liquidity shocks.  Hence, the liquidity shock may force costly liquidation of the 
earlier investment, reducing second period output.  As our focus is on developing countries, we 
assume that all financial intermediation is done by banks, relying on a debt contract.  We 
simplify further by assuming that there is no separation between the bank and the entrepreneur – 
the entrepreneur is the bank owner, using it to finance the investment.  The time line is 
summarized in Figure 5.  At the beginning of period 1, risk neutral agents deposit D in banks, 
which in turn use D to finance long term investment,  , and hoarding reserves, R.  A liquidity  1 K  9
shock, with the aggregate value of Z for the borrowing economy, materializes at the end of 
period 1, after the commitment of capital. A liquidity shock exceeding reserves induces a pre-
mature liquidation of Z - R.  Output increases with the capital invested at the beginning of period 
one, , and declines with liquidation at a rate that depends on the adjustment cost, θ.  Assuming 
a Cobb-Douglas production function, the second period output is  
1 K
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It is convenient to normalize the liquidity shock by the level of deposits, denoting the normalized 
shock by z: 
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Depositors are entitled to a real return of on the loan that remains deposited for the duration of 
investment.
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9  Assuming agents’ subjective discount rate isρ , competitive intermediation implies 
that  
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9 The possibility that the outcome of investment is not large enough to meet the promised rate of return is discussed 
later. To preview, this possibility does not affect the main conclusion of our analysis, because of the assumption of 
risk neutrality.    10
Net reserves held until period 2 are assumed to yield a return of  .  We denote the marginal 
liquidity shock associated with liquidation by  .   The expected second period 
surplus [i.e., net income after paying depositors] is:  
f r
D R z z / ,
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It is the sum of the expected output, plus the income associated with reserves net of liquidation, 
minus the repayment to depositors who get a return of ρ on the net deposit position,  Z D − .  
Applying (3) and the definition of the z*, we re-write the expected surplus as 
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The FOC determining the optimal demand for international reserves is  
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This condition is equivalent to: 
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where  is the marginal productivity of capital, and 
1 K MP ] Pr[ R Z <  is the probability that the 
liquidity shock is below the level of reserves. The expected opportunity cost of holding reserves 
is equalized to the expected precautionary benefit of holding reserves.    11
Figure 5 plots the final output (the solid line) as a function of liquidity shock, z, drawn 
for a given initial investment and reserves hoarding.  For liquidity shocks below z*, output is 
flat, independent of the realized liquidity shock.  A liquidity shock above z* requires costly 
downward adjustment of capital, reducing thereby final output.  A marginal increase of the initial 
reserves position will shift the output line in two different directions.  First, hoarding extra dollar 
reserves reduces the initial capital by one dollar, reducing output for liquidity shocks below z*; 
shifting the output line downward for z < z* (the downward shift equals ).  Extra dollar 
reserves implies, however, lower deadweight loss associated with liquidation, shifting thereby 
the output line to the right for z > z* .  The decrease in output associated with extra dollar 
reserves is depicted in Figure 6 by the shaded area below the old production curve, for z < z*.  
Similarly, the increase in output associated with the extra dollar reserves correspond to the 
shaded area to the right of the old production curve, for z > z*.  The expected net gain in 
production from holding reserves corresponds to the difference between the two shaded areas, 
properly weighted by f(z), as well as the expected gross income attributed to extra dollar 
reserves. Optimal reserves, which satisfy equation (7), maximize the overall expected gain.    
1 K MP
 
The first order condition characterizing optimal deposit can be rewritten as: 
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We first consider the case with small shocks to gain the basic insight for the welfare gains 
associated with reserves. In the absence of uncertainty, the optimal level of deposits ( ), and 
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Suppose that the liquidity shocks are either zero or , with probability half each, and  0 z f r = ρ .  If 
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Applying (8’) to (9), the first order approximation of the expected surplus can be reduced to 
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Liquidity shocks have a first order adverse effect on expected surplus.  In the absence of the 
insurance provided by reserves, liquidation induces a deadweight loss equal to the adjustment 
cost, θ, times the expected liquidation.  This result is not affected if we allow the optimal 
adjustment of deposits: the envelope theorem implies that such an adjustment would have only 
second order effects.
10  
  In a two states of nature case, perfect stabilization can be achieved by hoarding reserves 
equal to the liquidity shock:  ; adjusting deposits to  , thereby setting the 
stock of capital at  .  If the liquidity shock materializes, R would provide the needed 
liquidity, preventing costly output adjust.  If the shock is nil, there would no need to use R.  The 
assumption that
*
0 0D z R =
*
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*
0 1 D K =
f r = ρ implies that the cost of this insurance is zero.  Consequently, 
11  
 
                                                 




























Π = = = =  
(recall that the FOC determining deposits is  0




E R ). 
11 With more than two states of nature, R would be preset at the ex-ante efficient level, providing full insurance for 
liquidity shocks below z*, and partial insurance above.  While there is no way to insure complete stabilization, one 
expects large welfare gain from setting R at the ex-ante efficient level relative to the case of R = 0. 
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This simple example suggests that liquidity shocks have a first order welfare effects in the 
absence of reserves, and that hoarding reserves can reduce the cost of liquidity shocks from first 
to second order magnitude.  We confirm this conjecture by a detailed simulation of the case 
where liquidity shocks follow a uniform distribution, () 1 / ; 1 . fz λ λτ = =<  Figure 7 plots the 
association between volatility and the reserves/deposit ratio for the case where the level of 
deposit is kept at the level of equation (8’).  The reserves ratio increases with the volatility.  







   The increase in D is needed to mitigate the costly drop in output induced by 
reserves accumulation, and is needed to keep the planned capital at the optimal level.
 12 Table 5 
traces the impact of higher volatility for the case where both reserves and deposits are adjusting 
optimally, contrasting it to the case where reserves are set to zero [the last two columns].  
Specifically, the first four columns report the optimal reserves/deposit ratio, deposits, reserves 
and expected surplus as a function of volatility, assuming that R and D are adjusted optimally.  
The last two columns report D and expected surplus for case where R is zero, and only D is 
adjusted optimally.  
 
Discussion: 
In the absence of reserves, the volatility has first order effects on output: increasing 
volatility from zero to 0.6 reduces expected surplus by about 15%.  Hoarding the optimal level of 
reserves reduces the cost of volatility into a second order magnitude, about 3%.  Hence, optimal 
reserves have a first order welfare effect, increasing the expected surplus by about 12% relative 
to the case of zero reserves. Accomplishing this gain requires relatively large reserves, about half 
of the deposit level for the case where  6 . 0 = λ .  The effect of volatility with optimal reserves 
hoarding is to increase both deposits and reserves, while keeping the level of planned capital   
almost constant. 
1 K
                                                 
12 Recalling (2), higher R reduces the stock of capital in states of nature where  R Z <  by  R ∆  , but increases the 
stock of capital in states of nature where  R Z >  by  R ∆ θ .       14
  Our discussion assumed so far that the limited liability constraint does not bind: that is,   
 
(10)           for all  .  ) 1 )( 1 ( *]) [ 1 ( z D z z z D − + > − − − ρ θ
α α z
 
Indeed, it can be verified that the limited liability constraint is not binding in the simulation 
reported in Table 5.  We now show that our main results are not dependent on these parametric 
assumptions.  The limited liability constraint would bind if 
 in some states of nature, which may hold for large 
enough volatility and adjustment cost.  We denote the contractual interest rate on deposits in the 
presence of binding liability constraint by 
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For liquidity shocks above this threshold, we assume that depositors are paid a fraction φ of the 
output,  1 0 ≤ ≤φ .
14  Note that binding limited liability constraint implies that depositors are 
exposed to the downside risk associated with large liquidity shock.  Hence, depositors would 
demand a high enough deposit interest rate  d ρ to compensate for the exposure.  For risk neutral 
depositors, the equilibrium interest rate is determined by the following brake even condition:     
 
                                                 









, output is zero, and the bank would default.  Hence, a sufficient condition for the 








.  Equation (11) implies, however, that λ < z ~ , and the limited 










14 The conventional closed-economy assumption is  1 = φ .  The case where  1 < φ can capture the presence of 
repatriation risk, where the banks pays foreign creditors only a fraction φ of output for  z z ~ > , or the efficiency loss 
associated with debt restructuring. 
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Note that (13) is identical to the expected surplus in the base case of the previous section, (5’).  
With risk neutral agents, binding limited liability constraint changes the deposit interest rate, 
without changing the entrepreneur’s expected surplus and investment patterns.
15  
 
4.  Concluding remarks 
Our study has outlined a procedure that helps to identify the contributions of 
precautionary and mercantilist motives to the hoarding of international reserves.  Applying it to 
1980-2000, we found that variables associated with trade openness and exposure to financial 
crises are both statistically and economically important in explaining reserves.  In contrast, 
variables associated with mercantilist concerns are statistically significant, but economically 
insignificant in accounting for the patterns of hoarding reserves.  These results hold for most 
countries, including China.  We provided a model that shows that precautionary demand is 
consistent with high levels of reserves.  We close the paper with qualifying remarks.  As is the 
case with all empirical studies, more accurate and updated data may modify the results.  Our 
empirical study does not imply that the hoarding of reserves by countries is optimal or efficient.  
Making inferences regarding efficiency would require having a detailed model and much more 
information, including an assessment of the probability and output costs of sudden stops, and the 
                                                 
15 This result holds because we assumed the absence of enforcement and monitoring costs, and that all agents are 
risk neutral.   16
opportunity cost of reserves.  Our study reveals, however, that existing patterns of growing trade 
openness and greater exposure to financial shocks by emerging markets go a long way towards 
accounting for the observed hoarding of international reserves.   17
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DATA Appendix: Definitions of the regression variables 
 
Reserves: international reserves holdings minus gold, measured in U.S. dollars. 
R to M: ratio of reserves to the dollar value of broad money. 
R to Y: ratio of reserves to the dollar value of nominal GDP. 
 
LPOP: log of population 
LYPC: log of per-capita income  
LIMY: log of percent import share 
MVGX: three-year moving average of the growth rate of real exports (log change), lagged two 
years in the regression.  
VOL_XC: exchange rate volatility, calculated from the monthly exchange rate against the U.S. 
dollar.  
PLDE: the residuals from the regression of national price levels (measured in U.S. dollars) on 
the per-worker income relative to the U.S. (Table 1A) Time dummies for each year were used to 
control for time-specific common factors including the unit of denomination.) 
 
CRMEXEM: dummy variable for the period after the Mexico crisis, applied to developing and 
emerging market countries.  
CRASIAEM: dummy variable for the period after the Asian crisis, applied to developing and 
emerging market countries. 
CRMEXEMLA: dummy variable CRMEXEM, applied only to Latin America  
CRMEXEMAS: dummy variable CRMEXEM, applied only to Asia  
CRASIAEMLA: dummy variable CRASIAEM, applied only to Latin America 
CRASIAEMAS: dummy variable CRASIAEM, applied only to Asia 
 
Regressions of Table 1 and Table 2 all include country-specific constant terms. The sample 
comprises 53 countries that include advanced and emerging-market economies as well as several 
major developing economies. They are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, 
Hong Kong SAR, Israel, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, Algeria, China, Croatia, Egypt, 
India, and Morocco. Owing to data availability, Greece is excluded from the regressions for 
Table 1, and Luxembourg, Egypt, and Taiwn Province of China are excluded from the 
regressions that include price level data.  
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I II III IV V
LPOP 0.281 *** 0.183 *** 0.022 0.137 *** 0.021
(0.035) (0.038) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044)
LYPC -0.103 *** -0.090 *** -0.090 *** -0.084 *** -0.092 ***
(0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
LIMY 0.128 *** 0.144 *** 0.105 *** 0.135 *** 0.105 ***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
VOL_XC -0.005 *** -0.004 *** -0.004 *** -0.004 *** -0.004 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
MVGX 0.169 ** 0.159 ** 0.197 *** 0.169 ***
(0.059) (0.058) (0.059) (0.059)
PLDE 0.060 *** 0.042 ** 0.059 *** 0.046 ***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
CRMEXEM 0.064 *** 0.063 ***
(0.012) (0.012)














R squared 0.774 0.783 0.795 0.788 0.795
C r o s s - s e c t i o n5 24 94 94 94 9
Statistically significant at 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*).
All regressions included country fixed effects. 
Table 1. Reserves to Broad Money
(1980-2000)  21






Relative GDP per worker 0.324 ***
(0.008)
R-squared 0.439
Sample period 1980 to 2000
Cross section observations 149
Time dummies were included. 
Statiscally significant at 1 percent (***)
Dependent Variable:







Sample period 1980 to 2000
Cross section observations 50
Country fixed effects were included. 
PLDE refers to the residuals from the price-level regression  22
I II III IV V
LPOP 0.232 *** 0.181 *** 0.099 *** 0.169 *** 0.095 ***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
LIMY 0.045 *** 0.056 *** 0.036 *** 0.051 *** 0.034 ***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
VOL_XC -0.001 ** 0.000 0.000 -0.001 * -0.001 *
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MVGX -0.005 -0.010 0.024 -0.011
(0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027)
PLDE 0.024 *** 0.016 ** 0.033 *** 0.020 **
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
CRMEXEM 0.022 *** 0.022 ***
(0.006) (0.006)














R squared 0.880 0.896 0.903 0.894 0.904
C r o s s - s e c t i o n5 35 05 05 05 0
Statistically significant at 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*).
All regressions included country fixed effects. 
Table 2. Reserves to GDP
(1980-2000)  23
I II III IV V
LPOP 0.172 *** 0.100 ** -0.050 0.028 -0.047
(0.036) (0.039) (0.045) (0.043) (0.045)
LYPC -0.105 *** -0.091 *** -0.093 *** -0.103 *** -0.097 ***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
LIMY 0.108 *** 0.108 *** 0.074 *** 0.092 *** 0.074 ***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
VOL_XC -0.004 *** -0.004 *** -0.003 *** -0.004 *** -0.004 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
MVGX 0.130 ** 0.132 ** 0.176 *** 0.123 **
(0.060) (0.059) (0.060) (0.059)
PLDE 0.010 -0.006 0.012 0.000
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
K liberalization 0.163 *** 0.161 *** 0.162 *** 0.165 *** 0.161 ***
(0.020) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
















R squared 0.799 0.800 0.810 0.808 0.811
C r o s s - s e c t i o n5 04 94 94 94 9
Statistically significant at 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*).
All regressions included country fixed effects. 
Table 3. Reserves to Broad Money, with capital account liberalizations
(1980-2000)
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I II III IV V
LPOP 0.208 *** 0.167 *** 0.088 *** 0.117 *** 0.091 ***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
LIMY 0.043 *** 0.046 *** 0.028 *** 0.032 *** 0.027 ***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
VOL_XC -0.001 * 0.000 0.000 -0.001 * 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MVGX -0.021 -0.019 0.028 -0.038
(0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
PLDE 0.014 * 0.006 0.023 ** 0.009
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
K liberalization 0.034 *** 0.034 *** 0.034 *** 0.040 *** 0.033 ***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
CRMEXEM 0.020 *** 0.020 ***
(0.006) (0.006)














R squared 0.901 0.898 0.905 0.910 0.909
C r o s s - s e c t i o n5 15 05 05 05 0
Statistically significant at 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*).
All regressions included country fixed effects. 
Table 4. Reserves to GDP, with capital account liberalizations
(1980-2000)
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Table 5: Volatility, reserves and expected surplus. 
 
 
λ  z* = R/D  D  R  E[Π]  [ ] 0 = Π R E  
0 = R
D  
0  0 0.15 0 0.35  0.35  0.15 
0.2  0.15 0.17  0.026  0.35 0.34 0.16 
0.4 0.3 0.2  0.06  0.345  0.325  0.17 
0.6 0.46  0.26  0.12  0.34 0.3 0.18 
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Figure 1. Reserves to Broad Money






























































Figure 2. Reserves to GDP
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Figure 3. Effects of Selected Variables on the Reserves/GDP Ratio  
 
Effects of a one standard-deviation change in explantory variables
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Figure 4. Country specific effects 





























































































Standard Deviation : 0.17





The time line 
 
 
Beginning of period 1: 
Savers deposit D, Banks use D to 
finance investment  and hoarding 
reserves, R, 
1 K
R K D + = 1  
End of period 1: 
Liquidity shock Z materializes, 
reducing the net capital to ;  2 K









Output Y materializes, Y ; 
depositors are paid (
2
α ) ( 2 2 K =
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Figure 6 














Volatility and R/D ratio, constant D. 
The simulation values are   15 . 0 ; 02 . 0 ; 2 . 0 ; 5 . 0 ; 33 . 0
*
0 = = = = = = D D rf ρ θ α